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In keeping with Socrates’ advice that it is “a better thing to accomplish a little 
well than a lot inadequately” (Theaetetus, 187d), this master’s report provides a detailed 
study of a few relatively short sections of Plato’s Theaetetus.  After an analysis of the 
beginning of the work and its opening themes, I examine the Protagorean thesis as it is 
first revealed in Theaetetus’ second endeavor to say what knowledge is.  Rather than 
follow the entire course of Socrates’ account of Protagoras’ position, I bring out a few of 
the essential features of this initial presentation and attempt to gain some clarity as to the 
possible meaning and purpose behind Protagoras’ enigmatic declaration that man is the 
measure of all things.  The final section of my paper entails a close analysis of the 
dialogue’s last definition of knowledge: true opinion with speech.  Although this account 
does not answer all of the questions posed by the Protagorean thesis, we find within it the 
most promising approach to answering the question of the dialogue: “What is 
knowledge?”  While the Theaetetus comes to a close with this final attempt and ultimate 
failure to answer the question with which it began, I show that Socrates’ spurious 
arguments often serve more as pointers toward the truth than as refutations of the “truths” 
proposed. 
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I.  Socrates the Midwife & Theaetetus the Mathematician 
In Plato’s Theaetetus Socrates rather remarkably proclaims himself to be a 
midwife; his art, however, treats not women and their bodies, but men and their souls.1,2  
While he claims to be “sterile of wisdom” himself, he knows how to deliver the thoughts 
of others and how to discern whether a newly born idea is an “image and a lie or 
something fruitful and true” (Theaetetus, 150c).3  While we will see that Socrates is being 
less than honest with regard to his own condition, his analogy does draw our attention to 
an important feature of the dialogue: to a large degree, how the conversation proceeds 
will depend upon how far Socrates’ interlocutors’ particular capacities and tendencies 
allow it to go.  What, then, do we know about the dialogue’s namesake Theaetetus?   
It is through his teacher Theodorus that we are introduced to the young 
Theaetetus.  Upon being asked by Socrates whether he has come across any promising 
youths in the city who have “made geometry or something else of philosophy their 
concern” (144d),4 Theodorus eagerly reports that he has a student who is well worth 
telling and hearing about, and goes on to praise Theaetetus to the skies.  Not the most 
tactful of men, Theodorus explains that he feels at liberty to speak of his student so 
                                                
1 My reading of the Theaetetus is largely indebted to two courses I have attended on the dialogue, one by 
Christopher Bruell at Boston College, and another by my master’s report supervisor Devin Stauffer.  I have 
greatly benefited from their guidance in following the path of the argument through the text.  Any missteps 
along the way are, of course, my own.   
2 cf. Xenophon’s Symposium, Chapter 3 Section 10, where Socrates describes himself as also possessing 
the art of pimping, which he here disavows.  
3 Unless otherwise noted, all references given in parentheses are to Seth Benardete’s translation of Plato’s 
Theaetetus.  Noted emendations are made with reference to Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet, as are all 
other references to Platonic dialogues, unless otherwise noted.  
4 cf. Plato’s Charmides, 153d2-5.  
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enthusiastically because (if Socrates doesn’t mind him saying so) given how similarly 
ugly Theaetetus and Socrates look, there is no need to fear that anyone will mistake his 
admiration for desire.  That said, he goes on to explain that the young Theaetetus is so 
exceptional for his age as to be the cause of wonder.5  On the grounds of such an 
introduction, we are given every reason to believe that Theaetetus is the ideal 
interlocutor.  But if this were truly the case, one might wonder why the dialogue ends in 
an aporia.  Must even the best, brightest, and most promising of students be left at a loss?  
Or does the young Theaetetus, who is similar to Socrates in his youth in more ways than 
one, still have more to learn?  
Upon meeting Theaetetus, Socrates suggests that they might each learn something 
about themselves by examining each other.  Socrates tells the boy that he, for one, would 
like to examine what sort of face he has; Theodorus, as he explains, says they share 
similar features.   But Socrates then questions whether they should take Theodorus’ word 
for it, and if so, why.  He goes on to suggest that to determine the truth of a statement, 
one must look to the qualifications of the one who makes it, rather than simply 
determining the matter by relying upon one’s own senses.  Thus, if someone says two 
lyres are similarly tuned, one ought to consider whether the person speaking has any 
expertise in music.  By this logic, since Theodorus is not especially skilled in painting, 
there is no reason to trust his statement that Socrates and Theaetetus look alike.6  To this 
conclusion Theaetetus responds, “perhaps not,” showing polite and proper deference to 
                                                
5 It is worth contrasting Theodorus’ description of the ideal student with Socrates’ own in the Republic, 
485a10-487a5.  
6 cf. Hemmenway, 337.  
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his teacher by refusing to agree entirely with Socrates’ suggestion that “it’s scarcely 
worthwhile to pay him any mind” (145a).    
But Theaetetus’ hesitance might also point to the partial absurdity of Socrates’ 
argument.  While artists may be more attuned to certain subtleties, one need not be a 
Picasso to recognize that two faces look similar nor a Perlman to notice when two 
instruments are similarly tuned. Socrates curiously passes over all layman-like forms of 
observational knowledge.  The ability to recognize similarities and differences seems to 
be the starting point for the more sophisticated kinds of skills or knowledge belonging to 
those to whom Socrates suggests we must defer.  Moreover, this very ability would be 
involved in our own determination of whether someone else is in fact a skilled painter or 
musician.  Thus, our attention is drawn to the role that is played in our attainment of 
knowledge by the kind of simple awareness involved in comparing the likenesses and 
differences of our perceptions, if only insofar as this simple awareness is too obviously 
and problematically ignored by Socrates.  Whether or not it is properly called 
“knowledge,” the significance of this kind of elementary grasping must be kept in mind 
as we continue.  
After hearing from Theaetetus the less than convinced response described above, 
Socrates goes on to ask him whether it is worth examining a person to whom one is 
considered similar when the similarity is not one of appearance, but rather one of the soul 
in point of virtue and wisdom.  Here the otherwise reticent Theaetetus enthusiastically 
agrees.  To begin with, the question is no longer a direct challenge to the authority of his 
teacher (although Socrates does subtly suggest that Theodorus is not sufficiently skilled 
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in virtue and wisdom for them to defer to his expertise).  More important, Theaetetus’ 
eagerness reveals a second challenge to Socrates’ initial suggestion that one ought to 
defer to established experts when it comes to questions of the truth.  Theaetetus shows 
himself to be promising insofar as he cares for the state of his soul enough for it to be a 
matter about which he wants to gain his own knowledge.  For while we may often be 
willing to take the word of experts in other matters, when it comes to the soul, especially 
our soul and its alleged virtue or wisdom, it is not enough just to know what someone 
else, even one’s own teacher, thinks. 
Thus, we expect an evaluation of Theaetetus’ soul is soon to follow.  After all, 
Socrates says in response to the youth’s piqued interest, “[I]t’s time, my dear Theaetetus, 
for you to display and for me to examine” (145b).  But this apparent interest in 
Theaetetus turns out to be but a segue into an examination of an altogether different 
object.  After trying in vain to embolden Theaetetus by letting him know that he has 
never heard Theodorus praise anyone as highly as he has just been praised, Socrates goes 
on to ask him about his studies.  Surely, Socrates asks Theaetetus, he has been learning 
astronomy, harmony, calculations, and the like.  And, as Socrates says, he himself has 
everything about them “down to a fair degree” (145d).  Except, Socrates adds, “[T]here’s 
a small point about which I’m perplexed” (145d).  This small point will turn out to be the 
preoccupation of the entire dialogue, as Socrates shifts the focus of their conversation 
away from Theaetetus and his soul toward knowledge and its meaning.  Nonetheless, we 
must realize that Theaetetus’ soul remains under examination, albeit indirectly.  His 
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character will continue to be revealed through the questions he asks and the answers he 
gives, not to mention those he passes over.   
After easily getting Theaetetus to concede that to learn is to become wiser in 
whatever one learns and that the wise are wise by wisdom, Socrates asks, “And this 
doesn’t differ at all, does it, from knowledge?” (145e).7  At this point, Theaetetus, who 
had been complaisantly agreeing with everything Socrates said, admits that he is not sure 
what exactly he’s being asked; Socrates readily feeds him the answer that the wise are 
wise by knowledge and thus knowledge and wisdom are the same.  While Theaetetus 
agrees without hesitation, we must stop to note that this equation of knowledge and 
wisdom is by no means necessary or clear.8  While we may acknowledge a person to be 
eminently knowledgeable when it comes to sports trivia, we would not go so far as to call 
such a person wise on account of it.  Wisdom seems to have a character that is not quite 
captured by mere knowledge or, at the very least, not by knowledge of any sort.  
Moreover, Socrates himself is famous for portraying his own wisdom as consisting 
precisely in his awareness of what he does not know.9  Still, under the questionable 
assumption that wisdom and knowledge are equivalent, Socrates goes on to say that “this 
is the very point about which I’m perplexed, and I’m incapable of grasping it adequately 
by myself.  Whatever is knowledge?” (145e).   
                                                
7 The word in Greek is ἐπιστήμη.  Following Benardete, I will most often translate it as knowledge, 
although it can also mean science.  For Heidegger’s analysis on how one should and should not understand 
the question of the dialogue see The Essence of Truth, 109-117. 
8 Aristotle, for one, draws an initial distinction between knowledge and wisdom in Book 6, Chapter 3 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  Although he then goes on Book 6, Chapter 7 to describe wisdom as a specific type of 
knowledge.  
9 E.g., Plato’s Apology, 21d1-e2.  
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Despite being made up of knowledgeable men, Socrates’ audience seems to be as 
perplexed as he is when it comes to what knowledge might be, and they remain 
intractably speechless as he repeats the question.  After trying to lower the stakes by 
likening their inquiry to a child’s game, Socrates finally has to ask whether he’s simply 
“being boorish” (146a). Theodorus reassures him to the contrary and encourages 
Theaetetus to answer, if only so that he himself doesn’t have to.  Socrates for his part 
does not hesitate to exploit Theaetetus’ unwillingness to disobey the older and wiser 
Theodorus and urges him to “in a good and noble fashion speak out” and say what 
knowledge is (146c).  Theaetetus, who feels he must answer, begins by reassuring 
himself out loud that if he makes a mistake someone will be able to correct him.  At this 
point we would expect Socrates, who seems otherwise eager to encourage Theaetetus, to 
confirm his belief that any mistake can be corrected.  Instead he answers, “Yes, of course, 
if, that is, we can” (146c).  This qualified response causes us to wonder whether Socrates 
is less sure than Theaetetus is that all things can be known.  However that may be, 
Theaetetus proposes that knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is in fact nothing other than knowledges 
(ἐπιστῆμαι), the sciences and arts themselves, from geometry to shoemaking.  According 
to Socrates, his answer is, while “noble and lavish,” wrong (146d).  Giving one of his 
characteristic objections, Socrates explains that having been asked for one simple thing, 
Theaetetus has given an answer that is “many and complex instead” (146d).10   
But one might wonder whether Socrates’ dismissal of Theaetetus’ answer is as 
questionable as the answer itself.  For in asking the question “What is knowledge?” 
                                                
10 Compare Plato’s Meno, 74a7-10.   
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would one not at least have to begin by pointing to those things to which we normally 
attribute the word?  Socrates suggests that Theaetetus misses the meaning of his question 
entirely.  He’s not looking to count the various kinds of knowledge, “but to get to know 
knowledge whatever it itself is” (146e).  Theaetetus readily acknowledges this difference.  
He is, however, much more hesitant (answering “perhaps”) when Socrates goes on to 
suggest that if he were asked what clay is, it would be “ridiculous” to answer that “there’s 
the clay of potters, the clay of furnace makers, the clay of brick-makers” (147a).11  His 
hesitation here is indicative of the fact that there is something plainly not ridiculous about 
such an answer (and so too for Theaetetus’ answer regarding knowledge).  For in 
answering the question of what something is, why should we not begin by listing the 
various kinds that make up the class?  And does it not make sense in the case of clay to 
focus upon use as a determining factor for inclusion?  What is particularly suggestive 
about Socrates’ supposedly ridiculous answer is its emphasis on the way we use clay.  In 
other words, the answer suggests that in some sense what a thing is, or is known to be, is 
at least in part determined by its relation to human beings.   
Ignoring the possible merits of this kind of answer, Socrates goes on to explain 
that it is ridiculous because it assumes that the questioner already understands what clay 
is.  “Or,” he asks, “do you believe that someone understands some name of something if 
he doesn’t know what it is?”  Theaetetus answers “in no way” (147b).  But is this so 
                                                
11 Here I have amended Benardete’s translation, translating πηλός as “clay” rather than “mud.”  Not only 
is this more accurate, but it also makes more sense in the given context.  Here clay is clearly being 
distinguished from mere mud on the grounds of its ability to be used in a particular way: molded and dried 
into bricks, pots, etc.   
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unlikely?  After all, the entire dialogue to follow revolves around the question what is 
knowledge, and to ask that question in the first place, let alone make progress toward an 
answer, must we not have some grasp of what we are looking for?12  Is this not similar to 
the initial kind of grasp that Socrates passed over and the kind evident in Theaetetus’ first 
answer?  It is clear, however, that while we may start with some grasp or understanding 
of what something is, a deeper, clearer, and more confident understanding, which may 
rightly be called knowledge, or perhaps even wisdom, would require much more.  Just 
what this might entail is what the rest of the dialogue will try to determine.  For now, it is 
important to note that from the start our attention is drawn to what seem to be different 
kinds or levels of knowledge.  Furthermore, the question is raised as to whether or not 
there is something, namely wisdom, which somehow goes beyond or can be distinguished 
from knowledge, especially insofar as it may entail an understanding of precisely that 
which we do not know.  We must keep these matters in mind and consider what effects 
the dubious premises, assumptions, and oversights with which the dialogue begins might 
go on to have upon the arguments that follow.   
 
                                                
12 Compare Meno 80d5 ff.   
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II. Knowledge is Perception and Man is the Measure 
Having been encouraged by Socrates’ midwifery account and his offer to act as 
Theaetetus’ deliverer,13 Theaetetus makes his second attempt to say what knowledge is, 
suggesting that “knowledge is nothing else than perception” (151e).  In contrast to his 
first definition, this time he satisfies Socrates by making a unifying claim about the 
essence of knowledge.  But this is a curious answer for Theaetetus, a promising young 
mathematician, to give. For mathematicians deal mostly with abstractions that are not 
directly perceived by the senses; we neither see, smell, hear, taste nor touch, numbers.  It 
isn’t surprising then that the answer turns out not to be his own, as Socrates soon traces 
its source to Protagoras.  Perhaps Theaetetus, who has read Protagoras’ work many times 
(152a), is eager to have Socrates refute what might be a disconcerting challenge to the 
validity of his own endeavors. As Theaetetus admitted earlier, he has a concern about the 
question of knowledge that he can’t get rid of, and, despite having examined the question 
time and again, is unable to persuade himself that he says anything adequately about it 
(148e).  Whatever his reasons for proposing this definition might be, before they examine 
whether the answer is “fruitful or a wind-egg” (151e), Socrates rephrases it.  He asks 
Theaetetus, “Perception, you say, (is) knowledge?” (151e), and Theaetetus answers yes, 
making no note of any difference.  But it is important to see that this reformulation makes 
Theaetetus’ initial statement less comprehensive and extreme.  Rather than knowledge 
                                                
13 For a persuasive discussion of the ways in which Socrates’ midwifery account serves as more than mere 
encouragement, see Hemmenway, especially pages 325-331. 
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being nothing else than perception, Socrates’ statement suggests, or at least allows, that 
perception, while it may be one kind of knowledge or constitute knowledge in some 
sense, is not simply all there is to it.   
Having traced Theaetetus’ answer to Protagoras, Socrates turns their attention to 
an examination of its source.  As he explains, Theaetetus has “probably not spoken a 
trivial speech,” but rather one similar to what Protagoras meant when he wrote, “Of all 
things (a) human being is the measure, of that things which are, that (how) they are, and 
of the things which are not, that (how) they are not” (152a).  As this translation suggests, 
Protagoras’ “man is the measure” thesis abounds with ambiguity.  It is ambiguous 
whether the “ὡς” in “ὡς ἔστι” and  “ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν” should be translated as “how” or 
“that”; whether “χρημάτων” should be understood to refer to the qualities of things or to 
the things themselves; and finally, whether “ἄνθρωπον” without an article should be 
read as the human species generally or as an individual human being.14  Depending on 
how one reads each of these terms, Protagoras’ statement becomes either less or more 
extreme.   
Socrates begins by narrowing and radicalizing the meaning of Protagoras’ 
doctrine.  As noted above, ἄνθρωπος could be taken to mean the human species, such 
                                                
14 On this point classicist Kurt von Fritz insists: “There can be no doubt whatever that, in accordance with 
the prevailing linguistic usage of the time of Protagoras, and especially in reference to the preceding onton 
and ouk onton, hos estin means ‘that they exist’ and hos ouk estin ‘that they do not exist.’  Yet when 
Protagoras illustrates his point by means of the qualities or, to use Aristotle’s language, the poietetes, of 
‘warm’ and ‘cold,’ it seems equally clear that hos in both cases must mean ‘how,’ though in good Greek 
this would really be hoia.  At this point, however, one has again to remember that in early Greek 
philosophy, that is, for the predecessors of Heraclitus and Parmenides, warm and cold were not poiotetes, 
much less purely sensual qualities, but rather the fundamental contrasts of which the universe consists, and 
in this sense chremata or onta.”  
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that we as humans, occupying a common world, constitute the measure of 
things/qualities, that/how they are and are not.  Rather than go this route, Socrates 
interprets Protagoras’ position as more radically relativistic.  To begin with, he shifts 
from perception to the broader category of appearance and focuses upon human beings as 
individuals to whom things appear differently rather than similarly.  Using the example of 
wind, Socrates asks Theaetetus whether a breeze, feeling cold to one person but not to 
another, could be called “in itself” either cold or not cold.  Must it not be cold in the first 
place and not cold in the second?  “For,” he says, “whatever sort each perceives, it’s that 
sort that they probably are for each” (152c).  Furthermore, he claims, perception 
“is…always of that which is, and it’s without falsehood inasmuch as it is knowledge” 
(152c).  Thus, it is true for one person that the wind is cold, and no less true for another 
that the wind is not cold.  It seems no meaningful distinction can be maintained between 
the way things appear to the individual and the way that they are.  The coldness of the 
wind lies not in the wind itself, but in the perceiver, and if knowledge is perception, then 
truth is relative to the perception of the individual.   
 But during the course of the argument above, Socrates asks a line of questions 
that draws our attention to the issue of whether appearing and perceiving are in fact as 
equivalent as the argument assumes.  It is, obviously, not at all unusual for the wind to 
blow and for one person to be made to feel colder by it than another.  For example, 
someone who has a fever will be more sensitive to a breeze than someone who is healthy.  
We normally find no need to draw the conclusion of radical relativism from such a fact 
precisely because we are able to distance ourselves from an immediate perception and 
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explain why it appeared or revealed itself in a particular way to a particular person.  To 
be sure, Socrates’ statement that “perception is…always of that which is, and it’s without 
falsehood inasmuch as it is knowledge,” seems valid.  There is something that could 
rightly be called a kind of knowledge grounded in what is immediately perceived by the 
senses, if only a knowledge of the fact that this particular perception occurred.  In short, 
one could agree to the relativity, or subjectivity, of experience without having to 
conclude that there is nothing constant behind each of our individual and varied 
experiences.  While we all may have more or less different and necessarily private 
perceptions of heat and cold, this does not eliminate the possibility that something fixed 
is the cause of our varying perceptions, such that, for example, thermometers can 
measure temperature consistently.  In short, it has not been sufficiently shown that behind 
our subjective experiences there is not something constant, of which we could, through 
observation and reflection, attain some objective knowledge.   
 Moreover, that there is in fact something constant is suggested by the fact that 
while speaking of different perceptions of the wind, Socrates still speaks of the same 
wind.  While it might be that we cannot say the wind in itself is cold or hot, we can say 
that the wind exists, and that we experience the wind as something that produces in us 
sensations within a certain range of cold and warmth.  The properties of coldness and 
warmth do not belong solely to wind insofar as they belong in part to the experience of 
the person who perceives them.  But there is still a common world and a singular being 
that is experienced, i.e., the wind, to which human beings react in a relatively similar if 
not identical way.  So far then the example of wind would seem to suggest that for all 
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things each man is the measure of how they are and how they are not, but even this within 
certain limits.  The variability that exists within our experiences of the qualities of beings 
is not an irreconcilable variability.  Furthermore, far from being impossible, it seems 
evident that we can by virtue of reflecting upon and talking about our shared experiences, 
come to find these differences in perception to be entirely understandable.   
There seems then to be no need on the basis of the present example to draw such a 
strange conclusion as that of radical relativism.  If this is Protagoras’ position, then its 
grounds have not been adequately established.  It is indeed a puzzle why he jumps to 
such an extreme position from the common and seemingly unproblematic experience of 
people being more or less sensitive to a breeze.  Why, in Socrates’ words, does 
Protagoras “make this an enigma for us” (152c)?   Further pieces of the puzzle come to 
light when Socrates suggests that this first presentation of Protagoras’ theory, which 
before he said was only “probably” not a trivial speech (151e), is in fact a trivial, or 
exoteric, presentation.  He goes on to give what is “actually a not trivial speech” (152d).  
It still remains to be seen just what this exoteric doctrine meant, or what purpose it might 
have served.  First, however, we must consider it in light of the esoteric doctrine Socrates 
claims Protagoras told in secret to his students (152c-d).   
The esoteric Protagorean position that Socrates goes on to articulate he says is 
shared by many of the wise.  It is composed of two claims: nothing is one itself by itself, 
and all things come to be from motion.  As we will see, what each claim might mean and 
their relation to each other takes some unraveling to discern.  As regards the first claim, 
we get only a brief glimpse of its meaning.  Socrates quotes a speech which claims that 
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common language misleads us.  We fail to speak correctly when we refer to something in 
itself and call it big, for it will also appear small, and presumably what appears warm will 
also appear cold, and so too with what is “heavy, light, and all things in this way, on the 
grounds that nothing is one, neither something nor of any sort whatsoever” (152d). “But,” 
the speech continues, as an apparent explanation of the first claim, “all things – it’s those 
we say are the things which are (not addressing them correctly) – come to be from 
locomotion and motion and mutual mixing” (152d).  The speech seems to be a deepening 
of the problem of perception discussed above.  It challenges the notion that there is any 
being (wind) in itself that remains constant and distinct from our shifting perceptions, 
insofar as the claim is now made that we speak incorrectly in talking of “things” in the 
first place.  But the ground upon which this challenge is made is not immediately clear.   
Returning to the first claim of the speech, what exactly does it mean to insist that 
nothing is “itself in itself”?  If one reflects upon what it means for something to be small, 
one sees that a thing can be small only in relation to something else that is larger, which 
in its turn is only large by virtue of its relation to something smaller.  In other words, 
nothing is either large or small in isolation, “itself in itself.”  If one takes this claim as to 
the relational character of qualities, and combines it with the claim that all beings are in 
motion, then one begins to see why the qualities of things are constantly shifting.  But for 
the time being we are left wondering why the speech does not restrict its claims to the 
qualities of things, instead insisting that we are even mistaken in speaking of such 
“things” in the first place, for “nothing ever is, but (everything) always becomes” (152e).  
In other words, not only are its attributes, such as warm and cold, shifting and inconstant, 
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but so is the thing itself, wind, which is not even stable and fixed enough to be properly 
called a “thing” in the first place.  We will have to wait for a fuller explication of this part 
of the thesis.   
Having finished quoting the esoteric speech, Socrates then adds “about this let all 
the wise in succession except Parmenides converge” (152d).15  As Socrates explains, 
“with the line ‘Oceanus and mother Tethys, the becoming (genesis) of gods,’ [Homer] 
said that everything is the offspring of flowing and motion” (152e).16  “Or doesn’t he 
seem to mean this?” Socrates leadingly asks Theaetetus, who readily agrees.  But, of 
course, Homer doesn’t at all seem to mean this.  He seems to mean that two gods, 
Oceanus and Tethys, not motion and flowing, created all the other gods.17  Moreover, the 
first articulation of the motion thesis need not have meant that the origin of all things, 
from the beginning of time, is in motion.  It could have simply meant that all things 
presently come to be from motions and mixing.  The gods themselves could have been 
the source of this motion, rather than the other way around.  In short, Socrates’ additions 
and emphasis suggest and make rather explicit what would have remained only buried 
implications of the motion thesis as it was first articulated: all things, the gods included, 
are the products of motion.  As Seth Benardete suggests, having torn the veil from 
Protagoras’ speech, Socrates proceeds to do the same with Homer’s (105).18   
                                                
15 As Socrates later explains, followers of Parmenides insist upon the opposite: “all things are one and it is 
at rest in itself without a place in which it moves” (180e).   
16 Here I have amended Benardete’s translation, substituting “Oceanus” for “Ocean,” which seems more in 
keeping with the Homeric myth.   
17 On this point see Benardete, 1.105.  Note that in his commentary he translates “Ὠκεανόν” as “Oceanus” 
rather than “ocean.”   
18 cf., 180d. 
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Building up this thesis as if it were unassailable, Socrates asks, “Who would still 
be capable, should he dispute against so large an army and so great a general as Homer, 
of not proving himself to be ridiculous?” (153a).  Of course, Socrates had previously 
indicated that no less than Parmenides disputes against this army, not to mention the fact 
that he has not said where he himself stands among the wise.  However that may be, in 
light of the flimsy arguments he goes on to mount in its defense, his question begins in 
retrospect to sound sarcastic.  Socrates goes on to argue that the good is motion, and that 
the bad is rest.  For example, bodies come to be through motion and deteriorate through 
idleness.  The soul learns from activity and forgets by the kind of stillness involved in a 
lack of practice.  Finally, and most unpersuasively, quiet conditions at sea “rot and 
destroy, but the other things preserve” (153c).  These arguments are, in short, too 
unconvincing to be believed.  Does not the body get destroyed just as much by being 
excessively in motion as it does by being excessively idle?19  Furthermore, in the case of 
learning, which Socrates says is motion by which things “get saved and become better,” 
is this getting saved really best understood as motion?  Could learning even be possible 
without an element of stillness or stability in memory, or in the classes that 
fundamentally do not change?  Finally, the ghost of Protagoras himself, who is said to 
have died in a shipwreck, could likely attest to the fact that anyone at sea would prefer 
calm waters to storms.20  
                                                
19 As Benardete puts it, “We do not need the dysenteric Theaetetus, dying on his way to Athens, to know 
that the signs hardly suffice as signs of the second order truths, let alone of the truth that nothing is” (I.105).  
20 Diogenes Laertius, IX.8.55. 
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But all this becomes a bit beside the point once we stop to notice something very 
strange.  Not only does Socrates offer us a series of bad arguments, but the examples 
themselves are not even meant to show that all is motion.  Far from denying the existence 
of stability, the argument itself openly affirms it:  motion is not the source of all things, 
but of all things good, while rest is the source of all things bad.  Thus, where we were 
expecting to find proof or evidence in favor of the “all is motion” thesis, we get 
something quite different: bad evidence for a distorted version of it.  Rather than argue 
that all is motion, Socrates insists that, “[T]he good is motion both in terms of soul and in 
terms of body” (153c).  The dubious argument culminates in another reference to Homer, 
suggesting that “as long as the sun and its orbiting is in motion, all things are and are 
preserved both among gods and human beings…” (153d).  Far from throwing our 
ordinary experience of the world and the stability of things within it into question, as it is 
here articulated, motion seems to ensure the opposite; ordered and predictable motion, the 
sun in its orbit, holds the world together and preserves the things within it.  
It is a real puzzle as to why Socrates proceeds in this way.  If the purpose of this 
account is not to provide evidence in favor of the thesis that all is motion, then what 
purpose does it serve?  A clue to its meaning can be found when one consults the 
Homeric passage to which Socrates here alludes.21  The message in Homer’s mythical 
account is strikingly different from the one that Socrates here presents to Theaetetus.  In 
Homer’s Iliad, Zeus warns the other gods that not even with all their might combined 
                                                
21 For this reference, I’m indebted to Seth Benardete, who directs his readers to the original passage in 
footnote 25. 
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could they tear him from the heavens, he who alone has the power to turn the whole 
world upside down.  As Zeus makes clear to the immortals who marvel at his words, “It 
is by so much that I am superior to gods and human beings” (fn 25).  In contrast to the 
original passage, the meaning of Socrates’ version comes to light.  The sun in its orbit 
replaces almighty Zeus as the force that holds the world together.22  Natural necessity, not 
divine whim, is what keeps the world in order, preserving the things within it, and setting 
a new standard for good and bad.  Once again tearing the veil from Homer’s mythic 
account, Socrates suggests that the “forbidden secret” of Homer and his army of the wise 
is an esoteric, scientific account that displaces the mythical accounts.  But, as we saw, the 
evidence Socrates presented in favor of his distorted motion thesis was so obviously 
weak as to make any of its conclusions questionable.  We are left wondering whether the 
“all is motion” thesis rests upon more solid ground.  
 
The Speech of the Moment 
 
After the line of argument described above, Socrates returns to a more direct 
account of the claims he described as the esoteric teaching of the wise.  He asks 
Theaetetus to “follow the speech of the moment” and “set down nothing alone by itself as 
being one” (153e).  They are to adopt the suppositions of the speech, namely that 
everything is “becoming in becoming” as opposed to “in order and abiding” (153d-e).  
Presumably this can only be the speech of a “moment” because otherwise it too would be 
abiding.  However that may be, Socrates has Theaetetus consider the implications of this 
                                                
22 Compare Phaedo, 99c.  
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speech with regard to perception, using the example of vision.  Suppose, he says, that 
what we call white color isn’t something in itself, either outside or inside the eyes.  
Instead, all colors come to be “from the application of the eyes onto the suitable local 
motion” (153d).  Color is neither that which strikes, nor that which is struck against, “but 
something in between that has become private (peculiar) for each” (154a).  In this way, 
color, far from being a stable quality possessed by a particular being, is instead a singular 
and momentary event produced by the striking together of motions.  
The first part of this theory, while contrary to how we often speak of color, is not 
so far fetched.  We are, after all, familiar with modern science’s notion of color as 
“something in between,” namely the result of an interaction between the eye’s retina and 
the light waves reflecting off of an object’s surface.  What is more jarring is the degree to 
which (following the speech of the moment) Socrates goes on to insist that this something 
in between is “private for each.”  To begin with, he argues that things do not appear 
similarly to one human being and another.  Here we are reminded of the wind example.  
But Socrates then goes so far as to ask Theaetetus whether it is “much more the case that 
not even for you yourself (is there) the same thing, on account of the fact that you 
yourself are never in a condition similar to yourself” (154a).  Apparently one can neither 
step into nor see the same river twice.  The suggestion is that all things, the individual 
included, are in such flux that one could never say the same individual sees the same 
color twice.  Theaetetus surprisingly agrees with this far from intuitive suggestion.  
Indeed, upon reflection it seems true that every moment of existence is in some sense 
unique and unrepeatable.  If one takes the single example of our perception of a tree, with 
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different leaves growing, shifting, and falling with each second in the breeze, one can 
begin to see this point more clearly.  But despite these manifold changes, we still 
effortlessly recognize the tree as the same tree.  And despite all the ways in which 
Theaetetus’ own being might change with each passing moment, could he even begin to 
answer Socrates’ question if he didn’t possess an abiding self, present over an extended 
amount of time, and capable of remembering and comparing a collection of past 
experiences?   
Again, one is waiting for more compelling evidence in favor of a thesis so 
contrary to our everyday experience.  Socrates seems to be offering us just that when he 
goes on to tell Theaetetus, “Take a small paradigm and you’ll know everything I want” 
(154c).  But as we will see, the example Socrates proceeds to give has so little to do with 
a scientific account of perception that one wonders whether what he wants is the same as 
what those advancing the motion thesis want.  He goes on to describe the following 
phenomenon: “We say surely that six dice, if you apply four to them, are more than the 
four and one and a half times as much, and if you apply twelve, they’re less and half as 
much” (154c).23  As Socrates explains, this simple example stands in striking contrast to 
our ordinary assumption that nothing either increases or decreases so long as it remains 
equal to itself.  We normally assume that the nature of a being changes only by virtue of 
some physical change to the being itself, but this example shows quite clearly that what a 
being is can also change by virtue of a mere shift in its relation to other beings.  We come 
                                                
23 While Benardete here uses the word “apply,” it is worth noting that the verb in this case (προσφέρω) is 
different from the one used earlier and translated as “application” (προσβολή) in the context of the 
perception account (153d), further emphasizing the fact that here we are dealing with a different kind of 
application.  
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to see from another angle the way in which nothing is one itself in itself.  The example 
reinforces the notion that a being’s identity cannot be established by reference to itself 
alone because there is no itself alone; a being’s identity is constituted through its relations 
with other beings.  What, in other words, would six be if it were not more than five and 
less than seven?   
But, as we noted earlier, Socrates’ example, what he wants Theaetetus to know, 
points to the relational character of being in a way that is quite different from that of the 
motion thesis.  Nothing is one itself in itself because a being’s relations to other beings 
are constitutive of its character.  But the shift of these relations in this example is not the 
result of an underlying mixture of motions.  Here the emphasis is upon motion of a 
different sort, and a kind that is as, if not more, responsible for what a being is: the 
“motion” of the mind’s eye.  It is in the mind’s grasping of the four and the six together 
that the six appears large, and in its grasping of the six and twelve together, that the six is 
appears small.  But at this point another feature overlooked by the “all is motion” thesis 
comes to light.  While the six may shift from big to small, depending on the movement of 
the mind’s eye, that six is larger than four and smaller than twelve never changes.  Not 
everything is in motion.  From the point of view of the mind’s eye, there is a stable 
framework within which beings in their relations shift.  
Thus our most convincing example turns out to support the notion that nothing is 
itself in itself, but in a way that qualifies the notion that everything is in flux.  It is only 
after this revealing example that Socrates returns to an analysis of the “all is motion” 
thesis, giving his most elaborate and radical account yet.  Before doing so, Socrates tells 
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Theaetetus that what follows is for the ears of the initiated only.  The uninitiated he 
describes as “those who believe that nothing else is except what they are capable of 
getting a tight grip on with their hands, but actions, becomings and everything invisible 
they don’t accept as in the class of being” (155e).  Such human beings, Theaetetus 
replies, are both “stiff and repellent” (155e).  Lest we make the mistake of the uninitiated, 
it is worth pausing to consider whether the demand we have been making all along for 
“evidence” in favor of the motion theory has been, at least in some respect, missing the 
point.  If the entire gist of the account is to call our ordinary experience of the world 
radically into question, then why should we expect any “evidence” from the world as we 
know it to confirm anything other than our own delusions?  Let us try then to follow 
along with Socrates the speech of the moment and to accept “the mysteries he’s about to 
tell” (156a).   
Socrates begins by reiterating that the first principle from which everything else 
follows is the claim that all is motion.  There are, however, two species of motion, each 
being “infinite in multitude” (156a).  One has the power to affect and the other has the 
power to be affected.  The coming together of these two powers produces what Socrates 
describes as twin offspring: “that which (is) perceived and that which (is) perception” 
(156b).  While a countless number remain unnamed, Socrates explains that we do have 
names for many of these offspring.  The perceptions, for example, we call “sights and 
hearings and smellings…and…pleasures certainly and pains and desires and fears” 
(156b).  With each of these, the genus of the perceptible is “cogenerated” (156b).  Thus 
we have, “omnifarious colors with omnifarious sights, and likewise sounds with hearings, 
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and all the rest of the things perceived which come to be congeners with all the rest of the 
perceptions” (156c).24  
After laying out what would seem by all accounts to be a scientific theory, 
Socrates surprisingly refers to it as a myth.  Before addressing the meaning of this strange 
and suggestive remark, we should first see the way in which Socrates tries to bring this 
so-called myth “to completion in some sense” (156c).  He begins by returning to the 
earlier example of vision.  Using the instance of an eye seeing a white stone, Socrates 
pushes the analysis even further, holding that it is the very coming together of 
commensurate motions that gives birth both to the eye seeing and to the white stone 
being seen.  In other words, the eye as an eye, and the white stone as a white stone, are 
not present prior to this coming together of motions.  There is, as he explains, no thing 
affecting prior to its coming into contact with that which is affected, and vice versa.  It is 
only at the very moment these motions meet that there comes to be a motion affecting 
and a motion affected, an eye seeing and a thing seeable.  In this way, “nothing is itself 
by itself…but in the association with one another, all things become and become of all 
sorts from the motion” (157a).  Here we see most clearly the way in which nothing is 
itself in itself insofar as all things come to be through a mixing of motions. 
To begin to understand what this might mean, one can reflect upon the sensation 
of touch.  It is, for example, easy to see that when my finger presses against the computer 
key, and the key in its resistance presses back, both feeling (perceiving) and hardness 
(perceptible) are born together.  Still, it requires what seems to be an impossible 
                                                
24 For a second extended discussion of the all is motion thesis see 180d-183b. 
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stretching of the imagination to push the elements of this example as far as one would 
have to in order not to distort the theory that all is motion.  For, according to this theory, 
one cannot even begin by imagining two stable objects coming into contact.  The idea 
verges upon the unthinkable insofar as it asks us to conceive of motion without allowing 
us to think of there being some thing that is moving.  Indeed, when Socrates returns to an 
explication of this thesis later in the dialogue, it culminates in the insistence that we 
would need an entirely different language to be able to capture the truth of the motion 
thesis.  As it is, one must not even say “this is so,” or “this is not so,” “for ‘so’ would no 
longer be in motion” (183a-b).  Not saying “so,” if by this one means holding one’s 
tongue, might be feasible, but is it actually possible to think in this way?  The motion 
thesis, which began as an explanation of what lies behind the ordinary world of our 
experience, seems to bring us to a point at which we become entirely estranged from our 
ordinary world, and have, in fact, no way to account for it.   
At this point, we can begin to make our way back to the question of the meaning 
of Protagoras’ declaration that man is the measure.  As we saw, the thesis shared by all 
the wise (except Parmenides) follows from a claim regarding motion.  However, when 
pushed to its extreme, exactly what “motion” is turns out to be something of an enigma 
about which it is nearly impossible to say, think, or even imagine anything clearly.  It is 
important, however, to see that this difficulty need not make the thesis something to be 
simply dismissed.  As a sophisticated account of perception, and one held by “all the 
wise,” it is worth taking very seriously, as Socrates himself surely did.  Moreover, to 
focus entirely upon the apparent failures of this particular account would be to miss the 
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greater point, which is the limits of any scientific account of this sort.  By reflecting upon 
the particular difficulties of the motion thesis in its most radical form, a more generally 
troubling thought emerges.  As knowable as our given world may seem, what might lie 
behind the sense perceptions by which we take our bearings remains inaccessible and 
relatively mysterious, something about which we can only speculate.  Thus, any account 
of the origins cannot help but be, as Socrates said, a myth; such accounts maintain a 
mythic status insofar as they are at best likely, but by no means verifiable, explanations 
of the underlying character of the world to which we have no direct access.  The motion 
thesis, viewed in this light, points to the inevitable limits of human knowledge. 
These limits become especially problematic when considered with a view to the 
principal aim of the “all is motion” thesis.  As was brought out earlier, this thesis was 
meant in large part to displace the traditional mythical accounts.25  But because of its 
limitations, the “all is motion” thesis fails to provide a definitive account of the origins 
and underlying character of the world.  This failure, along with the inaccessible and 
thereby relatively mysterious realm to which it points, leaves room for a whole host of 
alternative explanations.  These alternatives include not only competing scientific 
accounts, as seen in Parmenides, but also the very divine accounts that the “army of the 
wise” hoped to conquer.  How, for example, has it been proven beyond a doubt that the 
ultimate cause behind wind is motion, as opposed to a “[servant] of the gods” 
(Memorabilia, 4.3.14), especially when exactly what motion is, in the final analysis, 
remains so far from clear?  
                                                
25 Compare Phaedrus, 229c5 ff. 
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Having brought out the above difficulty, we are now in a position to suggest a 
possible meaning of Protagoras’ exoteric position, which sets him apart from the rest of 
the wise.  While Protagoras shares with the others a belief in the “all is motion” thesis, he 
also maintains that concerning the gods, he is unable to know whether they exist or do 
not exist.26  Perhaps Protagoras recognized that the theory about perception and the origin 
of beings in motion shared among the wise left him without the adequate means to 
disprove another’s claim to having perceived the divine.  Thus, he asserts that human 
beings are the measure of all things, so as to relegate alternative claims to the truth to the 
status of being merely true for those individuals who make them.  On the other hand, to 
say that man is the measure is also to concede that such alternative claims cannot be 
proven false.  His unique wisdom among the wise seems to consist in the recognition of 
what he could not justifiably claim to know.27   
On this interpretation, the significance and strength of Protagoras lies not in his 
“solution,” but rather in the fact that he recognized that there was a problem in the first 
place.  Thus, it seems Socrates considered Protagoras the wisest of those reputed to be 
wise because he recognized the limits to his own knowledge.  That said, Socrates was 
wiser still.  He also recognized the limits to such scientific explanations.  However, rather 
than adopting the position of relativism, Socrates was prompted instead to take a new 
                                                
26 Diogenes Laertius, IX.8.51. 
27 To confirm this interpretation one would have to consider the rest of the Protagorean position as it is 
articulated throughout the dialogue, as well as Plato’s Protagoras, an examination of which is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
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approach: the Socratic turn to speeches.28  Despite the great respect Socrates had for 
Protagoras, both in the Theaetetus, and in his life as a whole, Socrates managed to move 
beyond the Protagorean position. As David Bolotin points out, the exact way in which 
Socrates and Theaetetus, with Theodorus’ reluctant help, are finally rid of Protagoras is 
difficult to discern.29  The aim here has been to try to bring out why he was worth taking 
seriously in the first place.  But, in short, by the time we reach the final definition of the 
dialogue, Socrates has returned us to the ordinary world, from which the motion thesis 
had left us estranged.  Furthermore, far from calling the validity of all speech into 
question, the last proposed definition of the dialogue presents speech as an essential 
component of knowledge.  Why one may want to start again from this beginning has 
become clear in light of the limits to the Protagorean account of knowledge.  
While Theaetetus and Socrates will move beyond Protagoras’ definition of 
knowledge, the questions and themes raised by the Protagorean thesis remain at issue 
throughout the dialogue.  Before proposing the final definition of knowledge as true 
opinion with speech, Theaetetus begins by defining knowledge as merely true opinion.  
While this second attempt at a definition leads to a relatively lengthy inquiry into the 
possibility of false opinion,30 it takes only a “brief” (201a) inquiry for Socrates to dismiss 
the definition once they return to it.  As Socrates explains, in courts jurors are persuaded 
rather than taught the truth “about whatever it’s only possible to know if one sees it” 
                                                
28 Phaedo, 99e4 ff.  
29 See Bolotin, especially pages 179-184.   
30 For an insightful essay on this section of the dialogue, and one that has had a strong influence on the 
reading of the dialogue presented in this paper, see Bolotin.     
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(201b-c).  Socrates shows clearly by this example that knowledge and true opinion must 
be different insofar as there is an obvious difference between what one opines from 
hearsay and what one knows as an eyewitness.  While a juror may be persuaded to judge 
rightly on the grounds of what others have seen and in this sense holds a true opinion, this 
opinion lacks the certainty of firsthand knowledge.  Therefore, it seems clear that 
knowledge must be something more than true opinion.  As it stands, the example of the 
courts suggests the impossibility of ever coming to have knowledge regarding the truth of 
that which one has not perceived.  Whether or not this is indeed impossible seems to have 
been the question lurking throughout the dialogue.  As we saw, it is precisely this kind of 
knowledge that Protagoras thought he could not have with regard to reports of the gods.  
The question now is whether, unlike the jurors, who rely on persuasion, opinion, and 
hearsay, we might be able to teach ourselves the truth about both what we have and 
haven’t seen.  It is with this question in mind that we begin our examination of the final 
definition of knowledge proposed in the dialogue.  
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III. True Opinion with Speech 
After the discussion of the jurors, Theaetetus recalls that he once heard someone 
say that “true opinion with speech was knowledge, but true opinion without speech was 
outside of knowledge, and of whatever there is not speech, these things are not 
knowable…and whatever admit of speech are knowable” (201d).  Could the origins of 
Theaetetus’ hearsay account be traced back to Socrates himself?  In the Symposium, 
Socrates explains that it was Diotima who, after asking him whether he knew “that there 
is something between wisdom and lack of understanding,” went on to ask, “Don’t you 
know…that to opine correctly without being able to give an account is neither to know 
expertly (for how could expert knowledge be of an unaccounted for [alogon] matter?) nor 
lack of understanding (for how could lack of understanding be that which has hit upon 
what is)?” (202a).31 While this statement is suspiciously similar to Theatetus’ new 
definition, it is important to notice the differences between the original and the report.  
Theaetetus’ version misses the nuance and emphasis of Diotima’s.  In her account in the 
Symposium, Diotima chastises Socrates for believing in contraries to the point that he is 
unable to recognize anything that might lie between them.  Theaetetus seems to suffer 
from a similar fault.  His answer draws a clear division between knowledge and non-
knowledge, without any indication that there may be gradations between.   
                                                
31 Again, I am indebted to Benardete’s notes for pointing me toward this passage in the Symposium (fn, 80) 
and am here quoting his translation of the text.   
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 Socrates asks Theaetetus to tell him “at just what point [the one whom he heard] 
was dividing these knowable and not knowable things” (201d).  Indeed, it would seem by 
virtue of the definition Theaetetus offered that there is a clear line to be drawn.  Yet there 
is a way in which Socrates sets up a nearly impossible task for Theaetetus.  For if what is 
not knowable is that of which there cannot be speech, how could he then go on to say 
more about which things are not knowable and which are?  When Theaetetus 
unsurprisingly cannot answer, Socrates tells him to hear a “dream in exchange for a 
dream” (201e).  Theaetetus’ opinion, as one attained by hearsay for which he has no 
account or understanding of his own, while it may be true, has as it stands little more than 
the status of a dream. 
 Socrates overcomes the difficulty of his own question by giving an elaboration by 
means of analogy.  In his dream, he “heard some people say that the first things were just 
like elements (letters) out of which we and everything else are composed, and they do not 
admit of speech…” (201e).  These elements, “each thing alone by itself,” can only be 
named, “and one should apply nothing to it if one will speak of it as that thing alone, 
since none of those must be applied at all—‘it,’ ‘that,’ ‘each,’ ‘alone’ —and ‘this’…For 
these expressions in running around get applied to everything, being other than the things 
to which they’re applied” (202a).  While the letters may only be named, when combined 
together they can become a speech, in the same way that the elements, “though they are 
without speech and unknowable, are still perceptible, but the syllables are knowable, 
speakable, and opinable by true opinion” (202b).  Socrates’ dream ends with the 
possibility of one having a “perfect condition relative to knowledge” (202c).  Is his 
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suggestion that such a perfect state is possible only in a dream?  However that may be, 
Theaetetus enthusiastically accepts the dream as his own (202c).  
This dream claims, contrary to the motion thesis discussed earlier, that there are 
certain first things, each of which exists in some sense “alone by itself.”  While one 
cannot apply “it,” “that,” “each,” “alone,” or “this” to these elements, they can 
nonetheless be named.  This makes sense insofar as such designations take away from the 
singularity of each element by placing upon it a general label referring to a condition 
shared by countless other things.  But does a name really escape this difficulty?  Proper 
names certainly appear to insofar as they have no descriptive aspect and have the pretense 
to singularity.  Still do they not have within them the implication of some “it”?  In other 
words, a name seems inevitably to carry with it the implication that it is some being that 
is being named.  But it is precisely the application of being or nonbeing that Socrates 
claims naming is meant to avoid (202a).32  In short, one might ask, what could be being 
named other some person or some thing, i.e., “that” or “this” or “it”?  Furthermore, the 
very act of naming presupposes the context of a language, a web of meanings of which 
the name is a related part.  What meaning could “alpha” have apart from all the other 
letters and language as a whole?  It seems then that strictly speaking, with regard to the 
elements as they are here described, even a name could not be spoken.   
                                                
32 A convincing argument to this effect can be found in Jacques Derrida’s essay “Signature, Event, 
Context,” where he analyzes the signature, an act meant to represent a singular and present intention yet 
one which also must be legible and repeatable, i.e. universal and detached from the present.  Through this 
analysis he shows the impossibility of ever simply capturing singularity in language, the signs of which 
must always be repeatable to be meaningful.  
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This line of reflection is suggested by a textual detail to which translator 
Benardete draws the reader’s attention (fn 81).33  In Socrates’ above-mentioned list of 
pronouns that cannot be applied to the elements, all the words listed were previously used 
in his very description of the elements with the exception of “this” (τοῦτο).  By going out 
of his way to include “τοῦτο” (this) along with “ἐκεῖνος” (that), Socrates draws attention 
by omission to the third possibility of “τόδε.”  The meaning of the Greek word, “τοῦτο,” 
which can be translated as “this” or “that,” lies in between “ἐκεῖνος” which means “that 
over there” and “τόδε” which means “this here.”  The exclusion of this last meaning 
prompts us to reflect upon whether the immediate experience of “this here,” present in 
the actual act of pointing, captures our initial grasp or recognition of an individual as a 
whole more than any speech could.  It seems the most primary experience of connecting a 
name with an object begins with someone pointing to that object, which we grasp in some 
sense as singular before a name is attached to it.  Pointing is the experience of the shared 
recognition of some singular whole that is presupposed by all naming.  In the act of 
naming, what was grasped as a singular whole is conceptualized, brought into a shared 
world of interrelated meanings, in such a way that it no longer simply retains this 
singularity.34   
Nonetheless, Theaetetus accepts the account as is and again affirms that true 
opinion with speech is knowledge (202c).  Socrates, on the other hand, is displeased by 
                                                
33 For more evidence for such subtle textual detail in Plato’s Theaetetus, see Fogelman and Hutchinson.   
34 This account does not mean to imply that we have an actual experience of some one thing itself in itself 
if by this one means in absolute isolation.  The point is only that it does seem something may be lost in 
language (which is not to say nothing is gained, i.e. that what the beings are is not also in part constituted or 
created by the meaning they take on in language). 
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the part of the speech that claimed elements are unknowable but syllables are knowable.  
So they put the hostages of the speech to the torture.35  In the attempt that follows to 
know for themselves whether what was cleverly said was true, the “hostages” seem to 
confirm the story that in the case of a syllable one has a speech, but not in the case of the 
element.  For the account of the syllable consists of listing the elements that compose it, 
and how, Theaetetus asks, could one go on to “say the elements of the element?” (203b).  
Socrates says this has been put right in the case of knowledge, and it does seem 
indisputable.36  If the elements are non-composites, then no speech, if speeches are a 
listing of elements, could be given for them by virtue of the fact that there are not 
elements of elements.  But, Socrates goes on to ask, what about the contention that the 
element is not only not speakable, but not knowable?  The discussion of this question 
turns on whether when speaking of the syllable they mean the elements or “some single 
look (idea) that has come to be when they are put together” (203c).  Theaetetus answers 
that they mean the former, which makes some sense.  Given that they had just taken as 
knowledge a listing of elements, if he were to say that they mean something else, then he 
would concede that there is something left over which they had not yet spoken of or 
known.  Yet is it worth noting that there is something plainly wrong about Theaetetus’ 
                                                
35 Before they take up the examples of the speech, i.e. the elements and syllables of letters, Socrates asks 
Theaetetus whether he believes the one who spoke “gave a glance anywhere else when [he]…said those 
things which we’re saying?” (202e5-7).  Theaetetus says no and Socrates does not pursue the matter, but it 
seems worth noting the strangeness of this question.  To begin with, the one who spoke obviously had 
something other than letters in mind, namely the “first things” (201e), for which the letters are only meant 
to be a useful analogy.  At the very least, Socrates’ question draws one’s attention back to this, lest it be 
forgotten.  But this point seems so obvious that it is worth wondering where else the one who spoke “gave a 
glance” when he said these things.   
36 Indisputable, that is, assuming there are foundational and non-composite elements. If nothing can exist in 
isolation, then insofar as elements cannot be understood independent of each other, the notion of their being 
non-composite loses its significance.  
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answer.  The very meaning of a syllable is that in coming together two or more letters 
form one sound distinct from each of the elements.  Rather than note a difficulty of this 
sort, Socrates goes on to point out to Theaetetus the corner into which he has painted 
himself.  If knowing the syllable (SO) amounts to knowing both the elements (sigma and 
omega), and the elements cannot be known individually, then how is it coherent to insist 
that one is “ignorant of each of the two, and in knowing neither knows both” (203d)?  
Theaetetus rightly finds this conclusion both dreadful and nonsensical.  
 Socrates emphasizes that “if there’s a necessity to know each of the two if one 
will know both, there’s every necessity for whoever’s going to know a syllable to know 
first its elements” (203d).  But it is important to see why they have been forced into what 
Theaetetus calls a dreadful and speechless state, and what exactly it was that turned this 
part of the dream into a nightmare.  The predicament results from the assumption that 
there is only one kind of knowledge.  While knowledge of the syllables may entail a 
listing of its components, it is not necessarily the case that knowledge of the components 
must also take the form of yet another such listing.  If this were the case, the process 
would either go on ad infinitum or, if there are indeed unknowable non-composite first 
things, one would have to concede that all knowledge is built upon what is fundamentally 
unknowable. But are these first things simply unknown or in insisting so would we be 
falling into the same trap that Diotima warned Socrates against?  Is there not some 
understanding entailed in our grasping of the first elements, even if this grasping must 
remain without an articulation?   
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 In any event, Socrates tries to rescue their speech by returning to the possibility he 
had suggested before (203c), that the syllable is not the collection of its elements, but 
rather “some single species that has come to be out of them, with its own single look and 
other than the elements” (203e).  Theaetetus agrees and Socrates draws the conclusion 
that there must, then, be no parts, for if there are parts, then there must be a whole (of 
which the parts are parts).  If there is a whole then what could the whole be other than the 
sum of its parts?  This brings them back to their initial difficulty.  Or, Socrates asks, does 
Theaetetus mean to say that the all (i.e. all the parts) and the whole (the single look that 
has come to be and is distinct from the parts) are the same or different?  Theaetetus does 
not quite know what he means, but risks the guess that they are different.  If the whole is 
different from the all, it seems they may be able to concede that there are parts 
composing the all without having to deny there is still some whole different from these 
parts.   
 In the discussion that follows, Theaetetus at least fights in a manly way (205a) to 
defend this assertion, but in the end he fails.  Beginning with an example of numbers, 
moving to distances, and finally to an army and “all things of the sort” (204d), Socrates 
gets Theaetetus to agree that in each case the number of respective things (6 units in the 
number 6, 100 feet in a plethron, x men in an army) “is all that each of them is” (204d).  
These numbers of things are the parts that form the all, and while Theaetetus tries to 
insist that the all is different from the whole, he is ultimately unable to defend this 
distinction.  Despite Theaetetus’ failure, Socrates’ examples give us cause to wonder 
whether a defense could have been made.  Following a mathematician’s inclinations, 
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Theaetetus agrees that there is no difference between what lies on one side of the equals 
sign and what lies on the other.  Whether it is 2 x 3, 2 + 2 + 2, 4 + 2, etc., combinations of 
this sort equal nothing other than 6.  He is then led by degrees to say the same of an army, 
losing sight of the fact that on the face of it this is plainly false.  An army is clearly more 
than the number of men of which it happens to be composed.  The notion of an army is 
one of a united whole that transcends the parts, so much so that in a battle scores of men 
could be killed without this meaning that the army as an army has ceased to be.  This 
point would not seem to hold in the case of a plethron or the number six, for if one were 
taken away from either of them, it would cease to be.  But even in these cases, is not a 
certain unity being overlooked in saying the number is all that each of them is?  When 
one says “six” or “stade” or “plethron,” the many does in a sense become united into one 
single idea, making the whole in some sense as different from the parts as the one is from 
the many.  In short, this account overlooks the unity of the whole. 
Nonetheless, when Socrates suggests that both the whole and the all are 
equivalent insofar as each means that from which nothing stands apart, Theaetetus gives 
up and changes his opinion, now saying “an all and a whole do not differ” (205a).  
Socrates points out that they have returned to their original predicament.  He provides 
two alternatives: either the whole is something other than the parts and so without parts 
entirely, in which case it suffers from the same unknowability as did the parts, for which 
there was no speech (205e), or it is nothing other than the parts, which are themselves 
unknown and so a collection of unknowns, no more knowable by virtue of being gathered 
together.  Either way, by this speech the whole appears as unknowable as the parts, and 
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so Socrates and Theaetetus no longer accept that the “syllable’s knowable and speakable, 
but for an element it’s the contrary” (205e).  
Having seen a difficulty within the speech itself that led them to deny one of its 
premises, Socrates then asks Theaetetus whether his own experience of learning letters 
confirms this denial.  In learning the letters or the elements of music, it seems we attend 
to and recognize “each one itself by itself”  (206a), and that in fact the “genus of the 
elements admits of a knowledge more vivid and authoritative than that of the syllable” 
(206b).  From this Socrates concludes that anyone who says the syllable is knowable 
while the element is unknowable is being playful.  Theaetetus is pleased to have the 
difficulty they had been struggling with settled so easily, and to have the possibility of 
knowing the elements and therewith the syllables reaffirmed.  But there is surely 
something playful about Socrates’ examples.  For in learning letters, if in one sense we 
attend to each itself in itself, we need just as much to attend to them in combination (most 
obviously in the case of diphthongs and double consonants).  Likewise, in learning 
chords we do the opposite of attending to each note itself in itself, for in chords the notes 
become indistinguishable insofar as they form one harmonious sound.  The example then 
shows that there is indeed a vivid grasping, but this is both of the notes (elements) and of 
the chords (syllables), insofar as each can present itself as a whole that is in some sense 
singular.  Without this grasping it is hard to imagine how we would be able either to learn 
to read or to play music.  While this grasping may be fundamental, it is not the “most 
complete and perfect knowledge” for which they have been searching, anymore than a 
chord is as perfect and complete as a symphony.  Returning then to the account of this 
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knowledge as true opinion with speech, they go on to examine what exactly “speech” was 
meant to signify (206c).   
 
Speech 
In this section Socrates presents three possible meanings for speech.  First, speech 
could mean the literal voicing of the ideas in one’s mind.  They are able to eliminate this 
possibility immediately since it is clearly something almost anyone is capable of doing.  
In short, anyone who has a thought in his mind is capable of putting this same thought 
into audible speech, and the simple voicing of a thought does not add anything to it; this 
sort of speech would effectively return them to the position that knowledge is nothing 
other than right opinion.  Next Socrates proposes that by speech the speaker may have 
meant the “capacity, when asked what each thing (is), to give the answer back to the 
questioner through the elements” (206e-207a).  He gives the example of a wagon, and the 
listing of its main components as an answer with which they could be content.  But he 
goes on to show that one could question whether this sort of speech is thorough enough, 
or whether to be a truly competent knower of the wagon’s being one would have to go 
“through the whole through its elements from end to end” (207c).  After Theaetetus 
accepts this definition as his own, Socrates goes on to argue that this version of speech 
also fails to guarantee knowledge.  Returning to the example of letters, he shows that one 
could know the correct elements composing the name Theaetetus without knowing them 
correctly in the name Theodorus.  Insofar as one makes this kind of mistake, he is said 
not to know the elements entirely.  While one would have right opinion and speech when 
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spelling “Theaetetus” correctly, he still lacks sufficient knowledge of these elements 
insofar as he is ignorant of them as they appear in “Theodorus.”   
There are at least two strange aspects of Socrates’ argument.  First, the difficulty 
he points to is one that he characterizes as commonly experienced by people when they 
are just learning the letters (207d).  This leaves open the possibility that at a certain point 
one would no longer make this sort of mistake.  On the other hand, if knowing anything 
means knowing it correctly in every possible instance in which it could appear, it seems 
that the bar for knowledge has been set impossibly high.  To return to the example of the 
wagon, not only would one need to know each of its elements, but one would also need to 
have knowledge of how each of these elements appears in any other possible context.  At 
this point, it is worth recalling Socrates’ remark that we are often content with a much 
more limited account and asking ourselves what would be a more sensible version of the 
argument.  The question is how one could know where to reasonably draw the limits of 
an account that could suffice for knowledge. If we consider again what one may need to 
claim to understand a wagon expertly, it seems there need be an awareness not only of 
the parts but more importantly of the properties of these parts.  In other words, an expert 
has knowledge of the possibilities and impossibilities of the various combinations of parts 
as opposed to every particular instance in which they could be found combined.  Thus 
one need not know every instance in which wood is used in addition to its use in making 
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wagons, but that it burns, floats, etc.37 In short, to say knowing letters requires one never 
make a spelling mistake, is to go both too far, and down the wrong road. 
Still, this sort of understanding, however thorough, remains only an understanding 
of the parts.  For example, one may know all one needs to about each component of a 
wagon, while remaining ignorant as to its actual use.  Thus, Socrates presents a third 
possibility for what could be meant by speech: having a sign by means of which one 
could say how what is asked about differs from all other things (208c).  This answer 
seems promising insofar as it helps both to set a feasible limit to what is required for one 
to have a claim to knowledge and to address the being as a whole.  Theaetetus is indeed 
pleased with it.  However, after spelling out that speech is taking the difference, while 
touching upon anything in common is speech about “those things, whichever they are, of 
which the commonness is” (208d), Socrates runs into another problem.   “All of sudden,” 
Socrates claims, “[he doesn’t] understand anything at all…[since he has] gotten too near 
to what is being said, just as if it were a shadowpainting” (209e).  He will point out the 
reason for this, “if he can” (209a).38  The argument runs as follows: if the speech added to 
right opinion about some particular thing is speech of difference, then the right opinion 
                                                
37 In remark 46 of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says that what he calls ‘objects’ 
correspond to the ‘elements’ referred to in the Theaetetus. By extension, his ‘atomic facts,’ i.e. 
combinations of elements (Tractatus, 2.01) correspond to the syllables.  According to Wittgenstein, “If I 
know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts” (2.0123), and “[i]n 
order to know an object, I must know not its external but all its internal qualities” (2.01231).  In other 
words, to know a thing is not to know every instance in which it exists, but every possible mode of its 
existence, i.e., not every fact in which an object like a ball happens to be found, but rather that there is no 
such fact in which a ball would be found leaning against a wall (Notebooks, 70e).  (For a particularly 
illuminating discussion of Wittgenstein on this point as well as others, see Ostrow especially Chapter One.) 
38 Little on the surface of the argument Socrates goes on to give seems to warrant this dramatic 
introduction, but it does point us to reflect upon a feature of our experience that might.  We somehow 
manage to grasp beings at once in their commonality and in their difference from all other beings, without 
having a full articulation of either.  
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held originally was of nothing other than commonness.  If this is the case, then there was 
never any particular, i.e. distinct, thing grasped in the first place, for all one had in mind 
were commonalities.  In light of this absurdity, it seems right opinion must already be 
also about difference.  But then it becomes unclear what speech about this difference is 
asking us to add (209d).  Socrates makes it seem as though the definition has us running 
in circles in that “of those things of which we have right opinion, by which they differ 
from everything else, it urges us to take in addition a right opinion of these things by 
which they differ from everything else” (209d).  He concludes that such an injunction is 
like the “exhortation of a blind man.  For to bid someone to take in addition the things we 
have in order that we may learn what we think, does resemble in a very grand manner a 
man who is wholly in the dark” (209e).39   
Thus speech is shown to add nothing that was not already present in right opinion, 
and the final definition of knowledge is discarded.  Socrates asks Theaetetus whether he 
is still pregnant and suffering labor pains about knowledge or has given birth to all that 
was within him.  Theaetetus answers, “Yes, by Zeus, and I for one have said even more 
on account of you than all I used to have in myself” (210b).  With this statement, he 
unwittingly casts doubt upon Socrates’ argument above, for he himself has shown and 
acknowledged that speech, especially speech induced through Socrates’ maieutic art, can 
bear more than one even imagined to be present in one’s thoughts.  Does this kind of 
speech give Theaetetus nothing more than knowledge of his ignorance (210c)?  As we 
                                                
39 This translation was recommended by Christopher Bruell in his Fall, 2007 lectures on the Theaetetus at 
Boston College.  
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have seen, while exposing Theaetetus’ ideas as wind-eggs, Socrates has all the while 
been laying seeds, so that if Theaetetus were to “try to become pregnant again,” he would 
be “full of better things on account of the present review” (210c).  
Which better things might we gain from reviewing the arguments above? With 
Socrates’ language analogy, we saw that the first things are like letters, which are grasped 
as singular wholes, and the closest we can come to articulating them in speech is by 
means of names.  The combinations of elements (syllables), while they can be divided 
into parts and articulated in this way, are also in their own way inarticulable, insofar as 
they too are grasped as singular wholes.  Thus, we have an experience of both non-
composites and composites as wholes of which there may be a grasping but not a full 
accounting in speech.   The first things may only be grasped and named (although it must 
be acknowledged that something is lost in the act of naming). Composite beings insofar 
as they are wholes are also only grasped and named, but can in addition be spoken of and 
articulated by means of their components (though it must be acknowledged that the 
whole insofar as it transcends the parts is lost in this articulation).  We ended with the 
question of what speech, be it an articulation of similarities or differences of components, 
could possibly add to our initial grasp if in that grasp we already have an idea of a being’s 
similarity and difference with regard to other beings.   
We can begin to see how the speech that asks us to “learn what we think” as if we 
were wholly in the dark is less preposterous than Socrates made it seem if we return to 
the analogy of language.  Throughout this section of the dialogue Socrates has been 
speaking of letters and syllables and language learning as if we never need to worry about 
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complexities beyond the coming together of letters into syllables, matters far from the 
kind of intricacies involved in a dialogue like this one.  Furthermore, the analogy as it is 
presented deemphasizes the fact that we learn to read after already having learned to 
speak, making it seem as though we begin with a clean slate.  But a curious thing can 
happen to people learning how to read.  Let alone the letters, whole words and sentences 
can be skipped over.  Rather than actually reading, one can by guesswork, memory, or 
inference be “reading” while paying little attention to the actual words on the page.  
Reading well often means getting past this tendency, and learning, once again, to take 
every word seriously.  If this is a challenge with language, a case in which we have little 
reason not to recognize the letters as they are, then one can begin to imagine the real 
difficulties to which the analogy points. The genuine complexity of our experience and 
our tendency to pass over this complexity, by assuming we already know what we think, 
combine to leave us in a condition that very well may be similar to that of a blind man, 
such that we have much to gain from an attempt to learn what we think.   
While our vision can in many ways be sharpened, as we have seen, there are some 
matters about which we will always remain in the dark.  We have, throughout the course 
of this paper, come across two substantial limits to human knowledge. On the one hand, 
as we saw with the motion thesis, our scientific accounts seem ultimately to end in the 
unknown.  As Socrates’ discussion of the elements put it, we run into that which can only 
be named, but not articulated.  That said, we must recall the question Socrates asked 
Theaetetus very early in their conversation:  “Do you believe that someone understands 
some name of something if he doesn’t know what it is?”  For Theaetetus the answer was, 
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“In no way.”  But we have seen that the answer is more accurately, “Yes and no.”  It may 
be that we know little about what lies beneath the foundations upon which we build our 
scientific knowledge, but that need not mean that we know nothing about the blocks that 
we use.  Still, as we saw, a theory like the “all is motion” thesis could not secure these 
foundations as those who held it had hoped. The question that science could not answer 
was whether there are gods, and if they are like Homer’s Iliad claims Zeus to be, i.e. 
beings who can at their own whim turn the world as we know it upside-down.   
Having reached this dilemma by following a theory that tried to bring to light the 
underlying character of being through an analysis of sense perception, we then turned our 
attention in the final part of the paper to what I suggested was a more Socratic approach.  
Here again we find another limit, this time having to do with the relational character of 
being.  If nothing can be understood itself in itself, then our understanding of one thing 
will always entail reference to another, which will entail reference to another, and so on. 
This would mean that our understanding could never be complete or exhaustive; on the 
other hand, it could be constantly becoming clearer and more refined, as we sift and sort 
through these relations, uncovering the differences and similarities between beings 
through speech.  Thus, while we would be dreaming to think we could ever be in a 
“perfect condition with regard to knowledge,” we need not remain in the shadows of our 
waking life.  We come as adults to reflect upon our experience with an entire world 
colored by opinions and beliefs handed down to us through tradition and hearsay, and 
with such strong ideas of what we hope and expect to find that we are likely to pass over 
or distort the very things that lie before our eyes.  But we can make our way toward 
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knowledge by examining the speeches that attend our opinions, measuring them against 
themselves and in relation to each other.  And in coming to learn what we think, not only 
with regard to clay and wagons, but more importantly with regard to those things of 
which we are most concerned to have knowledge, i.e. the good, the just, and the state of 
our own souls, we may begin to have more trust in our own knowledge than Protagoras 





Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics.  Trans. Joe Sachs.  Massachusetts: Focus Publishing,  
2002.  
 
Bolotin, David.  “The Theaetetus and the Possibility of False Opinion.”  Interpretation.   
15 (1987) : 179-93.  
 
Burnet, John.  Platonis Opera.  Vols I, III, and IV. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1901.   
 
Derrida, Jacques.  Margins of Philosophy.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  
 1982.  
 
Diogenes Laertius.  The Lives of Eminent Philosophers.  Perseus Digital Library. Ed.  
Gregory R. Crane.  October 2010.  Tufts University. 9 Sept. 2010  
<www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0257> 
 
Fogelman, Brian D. and D. S. Hutchinson.  “‘Seventeen Subtleties in Plato’s Theaetetus.”   
Phronesis 35.3 (1990) : 303-06.   
 
Heidegger, Martin.  The Essence of Truth.  Trans. Ted Sadler.  New York: Continuum  
Publishing Co., 2002.  
 
Hemmenway, Scott R.  “Philosophical Apology in the Theaetetus.” Interpretation 17.3  
(1990) : 323-46.  
 
Ostrow, Matthew B. Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Dialectical Interpretation.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 
Plato.  Plato’s Theaetetus: Part I of The Being of the Beautiful.  Trans. Seth Benardete.  
Chicago: The  University of Chicago Press, 1986.  
 
---.  Plato’s Symposium.  Trans. Seth Benardete.  Chicago:  The University of Chicago  
Press, 2001. 
 
Von Fritz, Kurt.  “Nous, Noein, and their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy  
(Excluding Anaxagoras).”  The Pre-Socratics.  Ed. Alexander P. D. Mourelatos.   
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992.  23-85. 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig.  Notebooks 1914-1916.  Ed. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M.  
 47 
Anscombe.  2nd Ed.  Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe.  Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1984. 
 
---.  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.  Trans. C.K. Ogden.  London: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Xenophon.  “Symposium.”  The Shorter Socratic Writings.  Trans. & Ed. Robert C.  
Bartlett.  New York: Cornell University Press, 1996. 
 
---. Memorabilia.   Trans. Amy L. Bonnette.  Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1994.  
 
  
 
 
